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Reliance Interests and Takings
Liability for Rail-Trail Conversions:
Marvin M. Brandt Revocable
Trust v. United States
by Danaya C. Wright
Danaya C. Wright is the Clarence J. TeSelle Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.

O

n October 1, 2013, the U.S.  Supreme Court
granted certiorari in a relatively obscure case,
Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United
States.1 On its face, the case involves an interpretation of
the property rights created by the General Railroad Right
of Way Act of 1875, which gave to any railroad, chartered
by a state or territory, “[t]he right of way [200 feet wide]
through the public lands of the United States.”2 The 1875
Act was passed after a brief hiatus in congressional support for railroads following the era of lavish land grants
between 1862 and 1871, in which over 94 million acres of
public lands were given over to the transcontinental and
other state-chartered railroads for sale to assist in financing the road’s construction.3 Besides being an obscure case
based on an equally obscure law, the procedural posture of
the case is even more unusual, as the government prevailed
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and yet
it supported the grant of certiorari.4
But in the oral argument, where the lawyers and Justices were focused on the simple issue of the property rights
granted pursuant to this 1875 legislation, there was a collective holding of breath for fear someone would mention
the elephant in the room: the potential for hundreds of
millions of dollars in takings liability lurking under the
case. In fact, the case could undermine the popular rails-totrail program, it could upset one century of property rights
upon which states and local governments have built roads
and highways and municipalities have held and transferred
land, and it could cost the U.S. Treasury untold millions of
dollars in compensation liability. This is no exaggeration. 

After the U.S.  Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
ruled in 2005 that the United States retained no interest in
an 1875 Act federally granted right-of-way (FGROW),5 the
takings liability for a portion of the 83-mile Weiser River
Trail in Idaho consisting primarily of FGROW came out
at $883,000 for the land and $2.39 million for attorney
fees.6 At that price tag, this case deserves far more attention
than it is getting.
So, let me back up and explain the legal issue, how
it arose, and why it is so important that the court carefully consider the history and implications of the case.  I
also want to address some of the questions raised in the
oral argument on January 14, 2014, for which neither side
had a complete answer, particularly the reliance interests
and the government’s argument about relativity of property rights. Part of the difficulty of this case is that the last
time the Supreme Court heard a case relating to FGROW
was in 1957,7 back when most of the current Justices were
children. The unique character of railroad property rights,
and the heavy involvement of the federal government in
supporting and regulating the railroads harkens back more
to Abraham Lincoln’s time than to the present.  But as I
explain below, a decision in favor of the petitioners could
undermine two centuries of government participation in
internal infrastructure, including the use of these lands
for current communications, recreational, or highway purposes, as well as their availability for future high-speed rail
or new transportation or communication technologies.

1.	
2.	
3.	

In the early years of the republic, there was a profound disagreement between the Federalists, who believed that the

No. 12-1173 (2013).
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482, codified at 43 U.S.C. §934-939.
See Paul Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 384-85
(1968). An additional 223 million acres were turned over to the states for
railroads, canals, and other improvements.
4.	 See United States v. Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust, 496 Fed. Appx. 822
(10th Cir. Wyo., Sept. 11, 2012) (not selected for publication in the Federal
Reporter, No. 09-8047).
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I.

5.	
6.	
7.	

A Brief History of FGROW

Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 35 ELR 20072 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
See Hash v. United States, 2012 WL 1252624 (D. Idaho 2012).
United States v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
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powers of the federal government included the power to
finance and construct highways, canals, or other internal
improvements within the sovereign domains of the states,
and the Anti-Federalists, who believed that the federal
government could give money to the states, but could not
dictate how it would be spent or on what internal projects.8
In 1808, Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin issued a
report calling for a vast system of internal roads and canals,
to be financed by the federal government.  But the plans
were stalled by a variety of succeeding Administrations,
some claiming the unconstitutionality of federal expenditures on local projects, others fearing favoritism and pork
barrel policies that would give certain locales undue advantages over others.9 Caught in the constitutional divide over
the strength and powers of the early federal government,
internal improvements proceeded in haphazard fashion
with some direct federal financial support, but most often
in the form of financial contributions to states to develop
their own projects.
With the construction and success of the state-supported
Erie Canal in 1825, however, the demand for federal aid
to assist states with transportation infrastructure reached
unprecedented levels.  Competition between Baltimore,
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia to provide the most
profitable transportation link between the western territories and eastern and European markets was fierce, but
political factions at the national level prevented any kind
of systematic and rational development until the 1850s. 
Canal projects were the first beneficiaries of a new kind of
federal largesse on which the U.S. Congress could agree:
grants of public land on which to build the canals (rightsof-way) as well as alternate sections of land to be sold to
finance construction. In a land-rich but cash-poor country,
the practice made sense. If the government gave away onehalf of its land adjacent to a canal or road, its remaining
lands would more than double in value and could be sold
to settlers for a sufficiently higher price to offset the value
of the lands given away. The first canal grants were made
directly to states to overcome any constitutional questions
about federal power to direct internal improvements, but
the states were unequipped to survey the lands, construct
the canals, and sell the adjoining lands to settlers, so they
immediately passed the lands through to the incorporated
canal companies.
Railroads were relative latecomers to the federal trough. 
Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, there was great demand
for federal support of railroads, but the iron road had not
yet emerged as the superior transportation technology of
the 19th century. Yet, not wanting to stand in the way of
progress, Congress granted railroads rights-of-way across
public lands starting in the 1830s,10 but it did not yet grant
8.	
9.	

See Gates, supra note 3, at 341-46.
See John Lauritz Larson, “Bind the Republic Together”: The National Union
and the Struggle for a System of Internal Improvements, 74 J. Am. Hist. 363,
381-87 (1987).
10. It seemed that few roads could be built at all without traversing public lands
at some point. See H.R. Rep. No. 24-1460, at 530-31 (granting a right-ofway out of New York City because there was no private land available).
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them the alternate sections of land, called grants in aid, for
sale to raise construction funds.  In 1850, however, Congress succumbed to heavy pressure from railroad lobbyists
and transferred to the states a generous land grant, including alternate-section grants in aid, from a defunct canal
company in order to construct a railroad from Chicago,
Illinois, to Mobile, Alabama.11 That opened the floodgates. 
In the second session of the 31st Congress alone, railroad
bills to grant rights-of-way and land grants in aid requested
an estimated 3,090 miles of right-of-way and nearly 14 million acres of land.12 In 1852, still resistant to the demand
for grants in aid, Congress passed its first general railroad
right-of-way statute giving to any state-chartered railroad,
macadamized turnpike, or plank road a 100-foot-wide
right-of-way across the public lands, but it reserved for
individual bills any land grants in aid.13
But between 1852 and 1862, numerous railroads succeeded in obtaining individual bills granting alternate
sections of land as well as right-of-way for location of the
road.14 And in 1862, with the removal of the southern congressmen during the Civil War, there were enough votes to
authorize substantial land grants for the federally chartered
transcontinental railroads to open up the western territory. 
Between 1862 and 1871, hundreds of millions of acres
were granted to the states or directly to the railroads and
withdrawn from settlement until the railroad had either
filed its map of definite location or constructed its road. 
But dissatisfaction with the speed with which the lands
were being brought to market, railroad corruption generally (like the Credit Mobilier Scandal), and the government land office’s withdrawal policy led Congress to cease
making land grants in aid altogether.
After the grants in aid ended, however, pressure continued to grant rights-of-way for railroad construction, and
Congress continued to oblige by passing individual bills. To
reduce the pressure from individual bills however, Congress
passed another general railroad right-of-way act in 1875,
the statute at issue in this case, now codified in 43 U.S.C. 
§§934-939. Congressional estimates are that roughly onehalf of all railroad miles are constructed on FGROW, and
that two-thirds of those FGROW were established under
the 1875 Act, while one-third was established under the
earlier 1852 general statute, or the pre-1852 or 1862-1871
individual grants.15 At its peak in the 1920s, there were
270,000 miles of railroad corridor.  If the estimates are
fairly accurate, this would mean there was somewhere in
the neighborhood of 135,000 miles of FGROW, of which
90,000 miles were granted under the 1875 Act and 45,000
miles under earlier grants. Over one-half of those 270,000
railroad miles have already been abandoned and were not
11. Illinois Central Grant, Act of Sept. 20, 1850, 9 Stat. 466.
12. John Bell Sanborn, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways, 2 Bull. 
U. Wis., 300 (1899); Appendix to Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 
14, 1852, at 428.
13. Act of Aug. 4, 1852, 10 Stat. 28.
14. See Sanborn, supra note 12, at 300-17.
15. See H.R. Rep. No. 11-572, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3 (Apr. 18, 1988);
Pamela Baldwin & Aaron M. Flynn, Federal Railroad Rights of Way, Cong. 
Research Serv., RL 32140 (May 3, 2006).
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preserved for other public transportation and communications purposes.  But in 1983, with amendments to the
National Trails Systems Act (NTSA),16 Congress provided
a mechanism for preserving as many miles as possible, a
mechanism that has been under steady attack by adjacent
landowners who want to take over these priceless national
corridors and who claim a taking when they cannot.

II.

Judicial Interpretations of FGROW

Although every congressional statute involving FGROW
used the same term of granting a right-of-way to the railroads, the federal courts have not been entirely consistent
in their interpretation of that term or in defining the nature
of that interest. For example, in 1881, the Supreme Court
in Railroad Co. v. Baldwin17 referred to an 1866 right-ofway grant18 as
a present absolute grant, subject to no conditions except
those necessarily implied, such as that the road shall be
constructed and used for the purposes designed.  Nor
is there anything in the policy of the government with
respect to the public lands which would call for any qualification of the terms.19

This language has since been interpreted to mean that
the railroad received absolute, unqualified fee ownership of
the FGROW in certain 1862-1871 grants.20
But in a case brought by an adjacent landowner who
was adversely possessing into the railroad’s corridor, the
Supreme Court in 1903, in N. Pac. Ry. v. Townsend,21
stated that the interest the railroad received in its FGROW
was “[i]n effect the grant . . . of a limited fee, made on an
implied condition of reverter in the event that the company
ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose for which
it was granted.”22 As in Baldwin, Townsend also concerned
a grant of FGROW from the 1862-1871 period. In 1915,
the Supreme Court extended its limited fee interpretation
to 1875-Act FGROW in Rio Grande W. Ry. v. Stringham.23 After 1915, the law was relatively clear that railroads
received fee interests in their FGROW, but most came with
a possibility of reverter that would result in return of the
land to the government when or if railroad services terminated, regardless of the period of the grant.
Stringham was overruled in 1942, however, when the
government argued that the Great Northern Railway only
received an easement in its 1875-Act FGROW on which the
railroad was threatening to extract oil and gas. The Supreme
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

16 U.S.C. §1247(d).
103 U.S. 426 (1881).
Act of July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 210 to the St. Joseph & Denver City RR. Co.
103 U.S. at 429-30.
MKT Ry. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114 (1894) (1866 U.P. Grant); New Mexico
v. U.S. Trust, 172 U.S. 171 (1898) (1866 A&P Grant); MKT Ry. v. Oklahoma, 271 U.S. 303 (1926) (1866 U.P. Grant); MKT Ry. v. Early, 641 F.2d
856 (10th Cir. 1981) (U.P. Grant); U.P. v. City of Atoka, 6 Fed. Appx. 725
(10th Cir. 2001) (1862 U.P. Grant).
21. 190 U.S. 267 (1903).
22. 190 U.S. at 271.
23. 239 U.S. 44 (1915).
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Court agreed without discussing what that nomenclature
might mean beyond who had the rights to the minerals.24
Citing a congressional shift in policy between the grants in
aid of 1871 and the mere rights-of-way granted under the
1875 Act, the Court relied on the fee/easement distinction
because limited fee interests would normally carry mineral rights, and easements would not. The Court did not
address earlier interpretations of 1862-1871 Act FGROW
or the role of intervening legislation on the characterization
of the railroad’s property right as an easement. Nor did it
address whether the easement characterization changed the
government’s retained interest in some or all FGROW.
In 1957, when the Union Pacific Railroad attempted to
extract oil and gas from its 1862 Act right-of-way, the government again argued that the railroad only had an easement.  The Union Pacific grant of right-of-way, however,
was from the period covered by Baldwin and Townsend,
which had not been overruled by Great Northern’s recharacterization of the property interest as an easement.  The
1957 Court was much more careful in its articulation of
the issue in United States v. Union Pacific RR. Co.,25 holding that the railroad did not receive any rights to minerals,
but carefully not referring to the character of the railroad’s
interest in its FGROW. The case did not overrule Townsend,
nor hold that pre-1871 FGROW was an easement. In fact,
the Court did not refer to the property rights the railroads
acquired in its FGROW at all.
This changing landscape as to what property rights exist
in FGROW has made it very difficult to figure out what
rights the government retains in this land, and what rights,
if any, may have passed to later patentees of the land traversed by the FGROW.  Under traditional common-law
categories, if the railroad acquired a fee simple absolute,
the government retained no interest in the land that would
prevent its alienation to private parties, and adjacent landowners would acquire no interests in a subsequent patent
of the section traversed by the right-of-way because all
available property rights had been transferred to the railroad.  Furthermore, a railroad with a fee simple absolute
interest in its FGROW could alienate the land to anyone it
chose upon termination, which is what the Union Pacific
did with a spur line it abandoned in Atoka, Oklahoma, as
recently as 2000.26 On the other hand, if the FGROW was
a fee simple determinable, then the government retained a
possibility of reverter or a power of termination and could
reacquire possession of the land when the railroad ceased
operating rail services.  The question would then remain
open whether the government retained its possibility of
reverter when it subsequently granted the adjoining land
to settlers via patents that merely reserved or excepted the
railroad’s right-of-way or the government gave its interest
away.  And finally, if the FGROW was a mere commonlaw easement, then the government retained its fee interest
24. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
25. 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
26. Union Pacific RR. Co. v. City of Atoka, 246 F.3d 682, 2001 WL 273298
(10th Cir. 2001).
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in the corridor land, subject only to the encumbrance of
the railroad easement. This servient fee interest could have
been retained by the government upon transfer of the section to settlers, or it could have passed in patents that only
reserved the right-of-way for the railroad. This latter argument is the one made by the petitioners in this case.27
However, the better interpretation is that the nature of
the FGROW is not limited to the common-law categories
but, like interests in trusts, can be customized by Congress
to carry with it certain powers and not others.  It might
revert upon abandonment like a limited fee and possession
return to the government, but it might include only surface
rights and not subsurface rights like easements. It can carry
exclusive possession like a fee interest, but be restricted to
a particular use like an easement. Because these FGROW
grants are both legislation and property rights, there is no
requirement that the interest must conform to the age-old
common-law categories developed prior to the advent of
the railroads themselves.  Because railroads require exclusive possession and because the use is infused with a public interest, the character of the property right does not
comfortably fit into any of the common-law categories
created for private property rights.28 The extensive regulatory power of the government over railroads, as well as the
mixed uses authorized by the legislation (such as telegraph,
post, military, and competing railroad uses), suggests that
the property rights railroads received are heavily imbued
with public trust characteristics and that the government
retains ongoing property as well as regulatory rights in
these corridor lands. This was the interpretation endorsed
by two attorneys for the Congressional Research Service in
their 2006 Report for Congress on Federal Railroad Rights
of Way.29
That the railroads acquired some hybrid property interest is supported by numerous factors raised in the briefs and
discussed at oral argument. First, the federal courts themselves have referred frequently to the interest in FGROW
as not needing to be shoehorned into any common-law categories of defeasible fee or easement. The District Court of
Idaho explained that:
Congress could pre-empt or override common-law rules
regarding easements, reversions, or other traditional real
property interests.  In other words, even if the 1875 Act
granted only an easement, it does not necessary follow
that Congress would or did not intend to retain an interest
in that easement . . . . The precise nature of that retained
interest need not be shoe-horned into any specific category
cognizable under the rules of real property law.30

27. See Brief of Petitioners, No. 12-1173.
28. For additional citations and explanation of this point, see Danaya C. 
Wright, Rails-to-Trails: Conversion of Railroad Corridors to Recreational
Trails, Ch. 78A, at 78A.09, in Powell on Real Property (Michael Allan
Wolf, ed. 2012).
29. Baldwin & Flynn, supra note 15, at 4-5 (explaining that congressional legislation operates differently from a common-law property right).
30. State of Idaho v. Oregon Short Line RR. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207, 212 (D.C. 
Idaho 1985).
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The Supreme Court has also stated,
[t]he phrase “right of way,” besides, does not necessarily
mean the right of passage merely. Obviously, it may mean
one thing in a grant to a natural person for private purposes and another thing in a grant to a railroad for public
purposes, as different as the purposes and uses and necessities, respectively, are.31

One court stated, “[a] railroad’s right of way has, therefore, the substantiality of the fee.”32 The Supreme Court
has referred to it as having the “attributes of the fee, perpetuity and exclusive use and possession; also the remedies of
the fee, and like it corporeal, not incorporeal property.”33
Congress’ power to structure the property rights in any
way it chooses through legislation is a well-established one. 
“A legislative grant operates as a law as well as a transfer
of the property, and it has such force as the intent of the
legislature requires.”34
Second, the easement the Court referred to in Great
Northern is not a common-law easement, but a railroad
easement, a property interest that state and federal courts
both agree is more robust and exclusive than a typical
driveway easement.  Easements as they developed under
the common law were mere nonexclusive rights of passage. 
They did not include the right to exclude the owner of the
fee or the right to dig under the land, alter drainage patterns, excavate gravel and take timber, build tunnels, or
affix bridge structures. The heavy and burdensome, exclusive use of rail corridors was at odds with the common-law
easement that preexisted the coming of the mass transportation age. But as railroads acquired eminent domain
powers to take private land, and often failed to construct
their roads as promised, state courts looked to two important characteristics of easements in construing and labeling
these interests.  Easements terminate upon abandonment,
which is not true of most fee interests in land unless a condition subsequent is explicitly created.35 And easements are
limited to a particular type of use being undertaken on the
land. State courts thus developed what came to be called
a railroad easement to indicate a property right that had
fee-like qualities (exclusivity, possession, and the power to
dramatically alter the physical landscape) and easementlike qualities (terminated upon abandonment and limited
to certain uses).36

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

New Mexico v. U.S. Trust, 172 U.S. 171, 181-82 (1898).
Midland Valley RR. Co. v. Sutter, 28 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1928).
New Mexico v. U.S. Trust, 172 U.S. 171, 183 (1898).
Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44, 62 (1874).
Conditions subsequent were rarely included in railroad deeds because, as is
true of interstate highways today, the idea that a fully constructed and operational railroad would cease to be used was barely imaginable. There were
many reversionary clauses for return of the land if the railroad was not built.
36. See Wyoming v. Udall, 379 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1967), explaining that the
concept of “limited fee” was no doubt applied in Townsend because
under the common law an easement was an incorporeal hereditament which did not give an exclusive right of possession. With the
expansion of the meaning of easement to include, so far as railroads
are concerned, a right in perpetuity to exclusive use and possession
the need for the “limited fee” label disappeared.
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Although the term easement was often used to refer to
this property interest, courts were quick to point out that
the railroad had fee-like powers in their easements. While
the railroad was operating, the interest was essentially
that of a fee with the right to exclude adjacent landowners entirely, and even immunity from adverse possession
claims because of the railroad’s public purpose. But once
the railroad ceased operations, the interest acted more like
an easement in that it would terminate if abandoned without an express condition subsequent drafted into the deed. 
When the Supreme Court referred to the railroad’s interest
as an easement in 1942, therefore, it did so on the basis
of nearly one century of jurisprudence recognizing that a
railroad easement was a unique hybrid property interest
developed to fit the changing times and technologies of the
railroad age.
Third, this property right is rather chameleon-like;
it looks like a fee when adjacent property owners try to
adversely possess into the corridor or claim rights to authorize third-party uses, and it looks like an easement when
the grantor government is claiming the power to regulate
and control use and disposition of the land. If one analyzes
the plethora of cases involving railroad property rights,
either under state law or in FGROW cases, the confusion
clears when viewed from the perspective of the challenger
claiming rights adverse to the railroads. When challengers
are adjacent landowners, they almost always lose because
the rights of the railroad are deemed to be superior to the
private neighbor.37 Thus, neighbors who try to adversely
possess into the corridor are denied that power because the
railroad is infused with a public purpose, and congressional grants of FGROW are deemed to be quasi-government
property rights that trump claims of private landowners. 
When the railroads attempt to exercise property rights contrary to the interests of the government grantor, however,
the courts usually subordinate their rights in the name
of the public welfare and congressional regulatory power
under which the land was granted to the railroads in the
first place.38
In the oral argument, Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer seemed to express skepticism about the government’s claim that the property right was a fee vis-à-vis
certain claimants, and an easement vis-à-vis other claimants.  As Justice Scalia quipped: “I’ve never heard of a
property right that is a fee sometimes and an easement at
others.” And Justice Breyer, trying to remember what the
venerable Prof. A. James Casner had taught him about the
relativity of property rights, mused at length about how fee
interests were different from easements. But neither attorney was able to give them a satisfactory answer. How could
the government be arguing that the railroad’s interest in
FGROW was an easement when the matter involved minerals, but a defeasible fee when it involved adjacent landowners trying to preclude conversion of the corridor to a
recreational trail?
37. The Supreme Court affirmed this in Townsend and in Stringham.
38. This is the reasoning of Great Northern and Union Pacific.
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The answer is quite simple, however. In the hierarchy of
property rights, the government grantor’s rights are superior to the railroads’, and the railroad’s rights are superior
to adjacent landowners’.  This is the well-established doctrine that property rights are relative. One in possession has
superior rights over one out of possession, but not superior
to the rights of the true owner.39 Whatever the government
gave to the railroads, it did not include the right to freely
alienate the property, the right to operate a petunia farm
on the land instead of a railroad, or the right to exclude
the government or grantees of the government who need
to use the land for other public purposes. And the government never gave to the railroads an interest that they could
transfer to private parties. This hybrid property right, with
its fee-like and easement-like qualities, is not only subject
to a superior federal regulatory dominion, but it is infused
with a public purpose that removes it entirely from the category of common-law property rights that developed in the
context of private land interests. When the sovereign exercises its constitutional authority to make rules regarding
the disposition of federal lands, it may construct the property rights to fit the public purposes for which the grants
are made.40

III. The Effects of Intervening and
Subsequent Federal Legislation
This case is made even more confusing by a series of statutes enacted in the early 20th century to manage and dispose of FGROW that was forfeited or abandoned.  After
the frenzied pace of railroad incorporation and construction of the last two decades of the 19th century, the new
century opened to the reality that many railroads that had
been granted alternate sections of land, as well as many
that had simply filed maps of definite location with the
land office for FGROW under the 1875 Act, had not been
built, and were unlikely to ever be built. In 1890, Congress
passed legislation to cause forfeiture of land grants in aid
if the road was not built, and subsequent cases treated the
duty to construct and operate as a condition subsequent
that would permit Congress to retake ownership of the
land.41 But the statute did not apply to FGROW acquired
under the 1875 Act. Under continuing pressure from settlers and competing railroads, Congress passed legislation
in 190942 to cause forfeiture of any portions of FGROW
for unbuilt railroads. Upon forfeiture, the land returned to
39. See Tapscott v. Lessee of Cobbs, 52 Va. (11 Grant.) 172 (1854). This idea
was also recognized by the Supreme Court in I.N.S. v. A.P., 248 U.S. 
215 (1918), when the Court held that a news-collecting service had no
property rights vis-à-vis the public, but substantial property rights vis-àvis a competitor.
40. U.S. Const., art. IV, §3 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States.”).
41. Act of Sept.  29, 1890, ch.  1040, 26 Stat.  496 (eliminated at 40 U.S.C. 
§§83-84 (1982)).  Schulenberg v.  Harriman, 88 U.S.  (Wall.) 44 (1875);
A&P RR. Co. v. Mingus, 165 U.S. 413 (1897).
42. Act of Feb. 25, 1909, 35 Stat. 647, codified at 43 U.S.C. §940.
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the land bank and could be regranted to another railroad
or patented to settlers.
In 1916, however, World War I intervened, the railroads
were disorganized, and they were ultimately nationalized
and operated by a federal agency intent on making the system rational and efficient. When the railroads were returned
to private ownership in 1920, Congress passed a comprehensive national transportation act that gave the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) the authority to regulate
railroad abandonments and incentivized the railroads to
shed unprofitable lines and streamline the system.43 Amendments in 1922 addressed what would happen to FGROW
that was abandoned after having been constructed, a prospect that was barely imaginable in the 19th century.44 That
Act, codified in 43 U.S.C. §912, provides that any FGROW
that is declared to be abandoned by an act of Congress or a
court of competent jurisdiction, will pass to a municipality
in which the FGROW is located, may be transferred to a
state or local government for any road or highway purposes
within a year of the declaration of abandonment, and if not
converted to a highway, will vest in the adjacent landowner
owning the section traversed by the corridor.
Although §912 does not identify the interests the railroads acquired in the FGROW as easements or limited fee
interests, nor does it identify the government’s interest in
FGROW as a possibility of reverter or a servient fee, the
legislative history of the statute suggests that it operates
when the government’s reversionary interests are triggered
and the United States reacquires possession of FGROW
land.45 Acting Secretary, E.C. Finney, of the U.S. Department of the Interior wrote in a letter to N.J. Sinnott, Chair
of the Committee on the Public Lands, that the bill is in
response to
the prevailing decisions of the courts [that] the railroad
companies to which grants of rights of way have been
made of the character under consideration take a base or
qualified fee with an implied condition of reverter in the
event that the companies cease to use the land for the purpose for which it is granted.46

Finney’s letter cites to Townsend and Stringham. He goes
on to write that
[i]t follows as a result of the rulings above cited that upon
the abandonment by any railroad company of any right of
way or any portion of any right of way granted to it the
legal title to the land included in such right of way reverts
to and becomes the property of the United States and does
not pass to any patentee or patentees to whom patents
were issued for the full area of the subdivisions subject to
the railroad company’s prior right of use and possession.47
43. Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456.
44. Act of Mar. 8, 1922, ch. 94, 42 Stat. 414, codified as 43 U.S.C. §912.
45. See, e.g., H.R.  Rep.  No. 217, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2, stating that
“[w]here the forfeited or abandoned right of way which would otherwise
revert to the United States . . . .”
46. Letter of E.C. Finney, Acting Secretary of the Department of the Interior, to
the Hon. N.J. Sinnott, dated June 9, 1921, reproduced in H.R. 217, id.
47. Id. at 2-3.
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Under §912, the land is to be transferred to the state
and local governments for highway purposes pursuant to
43 U.S.C. §913, and if not, it will vest automatically, upon
the official determination of abandonment, in either the
municipality or adjoining landowner. And for 66 years, the
statute operated to do precisely that. Once a FGROW was
determined to be abandoned, local governments had one
year to finalize any transactions regarding highways, and
then the land automatically vested in municipalities or adjacent landowners and no one cared whether the FGROW
was an easement or a limited fee, because the government
essentially gave its interests away once the railroad’s interests had terminated. For 66 years, §912 operated smoothly,
and without contest to dispose of the government’s interest
in terminated FGROW.
But in 1988, Congress realized the policy conflict
between §912, that gave away the government’s interest in abandoned FGROW to adjoining landowners,
and the 1983 NTSA Amendments that articulated a
national policy favoring the preservation of rail corridors
and allowed for their use for interim recreational trails.48
The NTSA authorized the conversion of rail corridors to
recreational trails if, during the process of ICC (now the
Surface Transportation Board (STB))49 abandonment, the
railroad entered into an agreement to transfer the corridor for interim trail use, and the railroad retained the
right to reenter and resume rail services. If the ICC/STB
issued a trail use certificate, the corridor would be railbanked for possible future reactivation, all state-law property rights that might be triggered upon abandonment
would be held in abeyance, interim trail use would be
deemed a permissible public use, and the corridor would
be preserved intact in case the need for future rail use
demanded its reactivation.50
In response to the policy conflict between the two statutes, Congress passed an amendment to the NTSA to provide that any abandoned FGROW not embraced for public
uses, including trail uses, would “remain in the United
States” rather than passing to municipalities or adjoining landowners.51 State and local governments retained
their power to use abandoned FGROW for highways,
but otherwise the land would be retained for preservation
and railbanking purposes.  In effect, Congress continued
its long-standing position that if the railroads no longer
needed their FGROW lands, they could be disposed of, or
retained, at the discretion of the United States.

IV.

Takings Liabilities

Since 1983, adjacent landowners have been partially successful at challenging the Railbanking Act as a taking of
their state-law property rights in adjoining railroad cor48. Pub. L. No. 98-11, tit. II, §208, Mar. 28, 1983, 97 Stat. 48, codified at 16
U.S.C. §1247(d).
49. I.C.C. Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 104-88 §201, 109 Stat. 803 (1995).
50. For further discussion of the NTSA, see Wright, supra note 28, at 78A.11.
51. Pub.  L.  No.  100-470, §3, Oct.  4, 1988, 102 Stat.  2281, codified at 16
U.S.C. §1248(c).
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ridors, for which they are entitled to just compensation
from the United States. They have argued that, but for the
Railbanking Act, the railroad would have consummated
its abandonment and reversionary or servient fee interests
would have vested, ripening their rights to acquire possession of abandoned corridor land.  Although the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the NTSA amendments in
1990 in Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n52 as a
valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power, the
Court ducked the takings issue, stating that whether the
statute worked a taking depended on the state-law property rights, for which a remedy was available under the
Tucker Act. Since the mid-1990s, landowners have taken
up the Court’s invitation to file compensation claims,
and the government’s costs slowly have been escalating,
although liability for a taking of state-law property rights
ultimately depends on state laws. Thus, in some cases, the
courts have found no liability when applying state law to
define the scope and nature of the property interests in the
corridors, and in others, the courts have imposed liability essentially for taking a trail easement from landowners
whose railroad encumbrances would have been removed
via abandonment.53
But a finding of federal liability for railbanking and
interim trail use over FGROW would take a sizable chunk
out of the railbanking statute. If one-half of the abandoned
railroad miles in the country originated as FGROW, and
two-thirds of that FGROW was granted under the 1875
Act, then there would be per se takings liability for thousands of miles of abandoned railroad corridor converted
to recreational trails if there is a determination that the
government had no interest in the corridor land after the
FGROW was abandoned.  But that per se takings rule
depends on a finding that §912, and its 1988 Amendment,
did not apply to 1875 Act FGROW because the government
had no retained interest in this land after it had patented
the adjoining land to settlers. If the government gave away
whatever interest it had underlying the thousands of miles
of 1875 Act FGROW that it granted in the 19th century
when it patented the adjoining land to private landowners, then §912 was simply inoperative and the landowners
would take unfettered possession of FGROW upon abandonment, just as they did for those parcels acquired by the
railroads under state law as easements.  And, ironically,
the seeds of this argument were sown by the government’s
own argument in 1942 that the railroads only acquired
easements in FGROW. Without also reserving either the
government’s possibility or reverter or servient fee interest
from the patents, the government had, albeit inadvertently,
opened itself to the argument that it had given away all
federal interests in FGROW. And what a pickle the government found itself in.

52. 494 U.S. 1, 20 ELR 20454 (1990).
53. See Wright, supra note 28, at 78A.13, for a more detailed breakdown of
states that do and do not impose liability for rail-trail conversions.

V.
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Applicability of §912 to Abandoned
FGROW

As I mentioned earlier, adjacent landowners never questioned the applicability of §912 to any and all abandoned
FGROW because the landowners received the government’s interest in the land upon abandonment by the railroad. But after 1988, the government had decided to keep
these rights-of-way when they returned to federal control
and use them for trails.  So, the same lawyers that had
been arguing that the railbanking statute worked a taking
because it intercepted state-law property rights that would
have vested but for the NTSA began arguing that interim
trail use of preserved FGROW also worked a taking because
it interfered with federal property rights that would otherwise pass to adjacent landowners. If abandoned FGROW
was not used for trails, adjacent landowners wanted the
land back, not retained and preserved for some unknown
future use.54 If retained FGROW was converted to a

trail use, landowners wanted compensation.

The glitch, however, was that if landowners relied on
§912 as the basis for their claim to a property right in
FGROW upon termination, then they really could not
complain when §912 was amended to discontinue the federal giveaway. What they needed to argue was that §912
did not apply at all to their FGROWs, and that the government’s retained interest (if any55) in FGROW passed to
them directly via their patents. Such an argument would
render an act of Congress (§912) irrelevant and is based on
the dubious logic that the government’s servient fee interest passed to patentees if it was not expressly reserved in
the patents that were granted in the late 19th and early
20th centuries.  There are numerous problems with that
argument, however. It goes against a long series of precedents holding that adjacent landowners did not receive any
interest in FGROW in their patents because that land had
been withdrawn and was unavailable for conveyance to
private settlers.56 It ignores the legislative history of §912,
which makes it clear that the statute was intended to operate on the government’s retained reversionary interests in
FGROW, and that it gave the land to adjacent landowners
precisely because they had not received it in their patents.57
It also passes right over the fact that the government did
not know until 1942, when the Supreme Court redefined
the interest in FGROW as an easement, that it had servient
fee interests it should have been reserving during the century before. Although omnipotence may be attributed to
the federal government, omniscience is a bit harder to swallow, especially in light of the complexity of the legal issues,

54. See Vieux v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1990); Samuel
C.  Johnson 1988 Trust v.  Bayfield County, Wis., 520 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 649 F3d 799 (7th Cir. 2011).
55. Remember, some FGROW was held to be fee simple absolute and so there
were no retained government interests in that land, nor could patentees
acquire any interest in it.
56. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 and cases cited infra note 58.
57. See Secretary Finney’s letter, supra note 46.
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the changing character of railroad property rights, and the
general decline of railroad jurisprudence and scholarship.
Logic has rarely stopped a takings lawyer. Focusing on
the sea change in congressional policy between 1871 and
1875 to strengthen the idea that the railroads only received
easements in their 1875 Act FGROW, landowners argued
that servient fee interests underlying easements were functionally different from possibilities of reverter.  The question then became, what rights, if any, did the government
retain in any of its FGROWs. If the government retained
an interest, was it a typical reversionary interest or a servient fee interest? Since §912 was passed when Congress
thought it retained only reversionary interests, arguably
the statute would not apply to servient fee interests. Thus,
trying to exploit the distinction between 1862-1871 Act
limited fees and 1875-Act easements, landowners and railroads argued that §912 either applied only to the pre-1875
FGROW, or to none, because in no instance did the government reserve any interest in private patents to settlers
other than the railroad’s right-of-way.
Nonetheless, this argument routinely failed, as federal
and state courts simply held that it did not matter whether
the interest was characterized as an easement or a limited
fee, the United States retained an interest in all FGROW
sufficient enough to justify application of §912.58 After all,
Congress would not have passed §912 if Congress did not
believe it had retained a federal interest in most, if not all,
FGROW, and the Supreme Court’s changing characterization of the railroad’s interest did not necessarily change the
government’s retained interest.  Since the railroad’s interest does not need to be shoehorned into any common-law
property category, neither did the government’s.
However, in 2005, the argument worked before the
Federal Circuit, which had been routinely finding takings
liability under the Railbanking Act for intercepted statelaw property rights in rail-trail conversion cases. In Hash v.
United States, Judge Pauline Newman held that a patent to
a landowner that merely reserves the railroad’s right-of-way
does not reserve the federal government’s underlying servient fee interests in 1875 Act FGROW, which had passed to
the landowner via a patent in the 19th century.59 Applying
existing Federal Circuit precedent for adjudicating liability, the Court held that when the corridor was railbanked
and used for interim trail use, the government’s continued
assertion of dominion over abandoned FGROW resulted
in takings liability for the government.
The Hash decision relied heavily on the characterization
of the 1875 Act FGROW as an easement, and acknowl58. Idaho v. Oregon Short Line RR. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207 (D. Idaho 1985)
(1875 Act FGROW); Marshall v. Chicago & Northwestern Transportation
Co., 31 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 1994) (1875 Act FGROW); Phillips Co. v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 97 F.3d 1375 (10th Cir. 1996) (1875
Act FGROW); Mauler v. Bayfield County, 309 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2002)
(pre-1875 Act FGROW); Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Corp., 440 F.3d 1227
(10th Cir. 2006) (pre-1875 Act FGROW).
59. Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 35 ELR 20072 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For
a critique of the case, see Danaya C. Wright, The Shifting Sands of Property
Rights, Federal Railroad Grants, and Economic History: Hash v. United States
and the Threat to Rail-Trail Conversions, 38 Envtl. L. 711 (2008).
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edged that the outcome might be different for 1862-1871Act FGROW, which the courts continue to characterize
as a limited fee interest. One basis for this distinction goes
back to the land office’s withdrawal policy, and the characterization of FGROW land as no longer public land available for settlement.  There were numerous cases between
settlers and railroads as to who had priority of claim when
a private patent was accidentally issued to a settler for land
that was covered in a railroad grant.60 The courts determined that upon the filing of the map of definite location
or construction, the railroad’s land claims were perfected,
and any accidental later grant to a settler of the same land
was ineffective because the land covered in the railroad
grant (including FGROW) was no longer public land
available for patent.  But these cases occurred well before
1942, when the easement characterization was introduced
into the mix. Thus, the standard mechanism for denying
that any retained government interest in FGROW passed
to patentees had not been litigated after 1942, in large part
because the government was not issuing a lot of patents
after that date.61 By deeming railroad FGROW land as not
available for private patent because it was no longer public
land, the courts avoided the issue of having to characterize
the government’s retained interest in FGROW and parsing
whether or not that interest passed via early patents.
Thus, the issue boils down to whether the government’s
retained interest in 1862-1871 FGROW is fundamentally
different from its retained interest in 1875-Act FGROW,
and if so, whether that difference affects the applicability
of §912 to terminated FGROW.  If the courts treated all
FGROW as being withdrawn from the public lands and
unavailable for patent to private parties, then §912 would
arguably apply to all terminated FGROW, and the interest
would indisputably remain with the United States unless
embraced within a public highway following abandonment. But if the 1942 easement characterization somehow
results in the government’s retained interest being deemed
sufficiently different from the implied possibility of reverter
in limited fee FGROW such that the withdrawal from
public lands argument does not protect it from having been
transferred via patent, then the Hash decision would hold
that the government gave away all its interest in forfeited
or abandoned easement FGROW when it patented the
adjoining land.
Suffice it to say that if 1875 Act FGROW for some reason is not deemed to be subject to the same withdrawal
policies as 1862-1871 Act FGROW, and somehow the
government’s retained interest was not reserved when the
section of land was patented to private landowners,62 the
60. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267; Jamestown & Northern R. Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 
125 (1900); Stalker v. Oregon Short Line RR., 225 U.S. 142 (1912).
61. Although homesteading did not officially end until 1976, with the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, most homesteading along transportation
corridors and waterways had ended in the early 20th century.
62. The court in Hash relied on constructional rules that hold that ambiguities
in grants operate against the grantor, so that if the government did not
expressly reserve its own interest in the FGROW when it reserved the railroads’ interests in subsequent patents, it cannot come back later and claim
an implied right was reserved. But there are other equally important con-
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government is in a sticky spot. It not only has been asserting regulatory control over abandonments since 1920 that
arguably affect underlying private-property rights, but its
granting of abandoned FGROW to municipalities and
state and local governments for highway purposes since
1922 may have been ultra vires.
The Hash decision was subsequently followed by some
lower courts, as well as the Supreme Court of South
Dakota, which reversed an earlier decision holding that
§912 applied to 1875-Act FGROW.63 I will not comment
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decision of Judge Richard Posner, finding that §912 did not
apply to an 1852-Act FGROW on the basis of Great Northern’s articulation of the seismic shift in congressional attitudes 23 years after the grant was made.64 In the takings
context, these cases have all ordered compensation for trail
uses over abandoned FGROW that was made pursuant to
the 1875 Act, and did not result in the landowners actually
getting the land back.  This point is relevant to the issue
of reliance interests posed by several Justices at the Brandt
oral argument, which I take up below.
The Tenth Circuit, however, which has the majority of
§912 precedents and had directly addressed the question
of §912’s applicability to 1875 Act FGROW, as well as to
1862-1871 Act FGROW, refused to follow the Hash reasoning, holding instead that its prior precedents required a
finding that §912 applied to all FGROW, regardless of the
label of the railroad’s interest. Earlier Tenth Circuit decisions helped develop the precedents that all FGROW is
a hybrid, robust property right in the railroads, that it is
subject to continued federal control, and that upon abandonment, the corridor land returns to the United States for
subsequent disposition or retention, in line with the public
welfare. That case, Brandt Trust v. United States,65 cemented
the split among the circuits that led to the government supporting the grant of certiorari to resolve the nature of the
property interest retained by the government in FGROW
and the applicability of §912, and its 1988 NTSA Amendments, on all publicly granted railroad rights-of-way.

VI. Reliance Interests
One of the most prominent questions asked at the oral
argument in this case was what reliance interests would be
most affected by the different possible judgments. If §912
is held to be inapplicable to some FGROW, then municipalities and state and local highway uses of this land could
structional rules that grants by the government are construed in favor of
retaining property rights for the public, even when they are not expressly
retained.  This issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but it should be
understood that there is plenty of authority for the proposition that grants
by the government to private parties should be construed narrowly.
63. Beres v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 403 (2005); Blendu v. United States, 75
Fed. Cl. 543 (2007); Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Brown v. N. Hills Reg. RR. Authority, 732 N.W.2d 732
(S.D. 2007); Home on the Range v. AT&T Corp., 386 F. Supp. 2d 999
(S.D. Ind. 2005).
64. Samuel C. Johnson Trust v. Bayfield County, Wis., 649 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 
2011).
65. Brandt Trust v. United States, 496 Fed. App’x 822 (10th Cir. 2012).
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be undermined. On the other hand, Justice Breyer imagined that if the Court ruled in favor of the government,
landowners who had built houses on abandoned FGROW
might find a bicycle trail being run right through their living rooms. Neither attorney could say how many miles of
highways had been built on abandoned FGROW, nor how
many acres of land had passed to municipalities or adjacent
landowners during the 83 years that §912 had operated to
vest the federal interest in abandoned FGROW in others. 
But the Court seemed very interested in the amicus brief
of the state and local governments that supported the government’s position and was worried that a decision finding §912 to be inapplicable would undermine decades of
settled property rights in municipalities, and in state and
local highways.66
Although several Justices seemed concerned at the fact
that the government could not state with any reasonable
degree of precision how much FGROW had been converted to highways or given to municipalities, the problem
of reliance interests dissolves quickly in favor of the government when one stops and thinks about the nature of the
claimed property rights in this case.  We can see this by
working out who would have the various property rights
at different historical periods based on the different rights
being claimed.
We can begin by assuming, as the petitioners argue,
that the government retained no property rights in 1875
Act FGROW once it patented the adjoining land to settlers
(i.e., that the railroad received only an easement and the
servient fee interest was patented to adjoining landowners). What would result upon termination of the railroad’s
right-of-way? Prior to 1922, when there was no process
for disposing of abandoned FGROW, Congress routinely
retook forfeited FGROW and regranted them to other railroads, just as it had done with forfeited canal grants. Or,
if no other railroad was interested in the land, it would be
returned to the land bank and made available for settlement. At that point, the FGROW would be terminated and
subsequent patents would be free and clear of any encumbrance. Those landowners’ rights would not be jeopardized
by a determination of the Court either way. But what happened to forfeited FGROW when the adjacent section had
already been patented prior to 1922? That land, if it was not
encompassed in some other public transportation or communications use, passed to adjacent landowners.
But in1922, when Congress passed 43 U.S.C. §912, the
government made two important changes. First, it specified that abandonment could only be determined by an act
of Congress or a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. This imposed a procedural hurdle on the unburdening of the servient land that could, arguably, have been a
taking without just compensation in any instance when the
railroad’s actions would have met a determination of aban66. Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures, National League of
Cities, National Association of Counties, International City/County Management Association, United States Conference of Mayors, International
Municipal Lawyers Association, and American Planning Association as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent.
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donment but for the failure to meet the procedural requirements of abandonment under §912. The Petitioner in this
case has filed such a claim, and the statute of limitations
on such a claim might very well have run, but the point is
important. If the government had no property interest in
the FGROW, then arguably it could not place procedural
requirements in the way of the railroads’ and the landowners’ legal rights upon abandonment.
The statute also purported to grant the right-of-way land
to municipalities or state or local governments that converted the corridor to a public highway within one year. 
If the government had no interest in the land after patenting it to settlers, then all claims of municipalities and
local highway departments to this land arguably would
be without legal foundation and could constitute takings
without just compensation.  In the legislative history of
§912, it was noted that there are already hundreds of miles
of highways within FGROW.67 Moreover, this would be
the case not just for highways placed longitudinally in rail
corridors, but for the thousands of road crossings that were
negotiated solely between the railroads and the counties
and states. Assuming road crossings were negotiated while
the railroad was still active, the landowner would arguably
have needed to participate in those negotiations if the road
was to remain upon the railroad’s termination. If the road
crossing was negotiated after abandonment, then only the
landowner would have been authorized to grant a road
crossing and the statute authorizing transfer of abandoned
FGROW to state and local governments for highways also
would be ineffective.68 Yet, thousands of road crossings
exist across FGROW without reference to the adjoining
landowners’ rights, and §§912 and 913 clearly give the government the authority to make the relevant contracts and
deeds to transfer road rights to local governments. All of
those arrangements would be at risk if the statutes were
deemed to be inapplicable.
Moreover, any municipality that acquired FGROW
pursuant to §912 would also be at risk of a takings challenge.  Since its peak in the 1920s of over 270,000 miles
of rail corridor, the national rail network has shrunk to
less than one-half, at approximately 120,000 miles today. 
Assuming that one-third of the lost 150,000 miles was
1875 Act FGROW, it is unquestionable that thousands of
municipalities and local governments have received property interests pursuant to §§912 and 913 that could be
undermined if the Court determines that the government
did not have the authority to exercise power over the disposition of this land.
The reliance interests of state and local governments,
when one considers the land acquired by municipalities

and land used for highway and road crossings, as well as
service roads or public access roads, are immense. Municipalities that acquired rights to abandoned FGROW have
disposed of this land or used it for other public purposes
in reliance on §912 for 66 years, between 1922 and 1988. 
Although the true extent of the reliance interests are difficult to determine without examining the records of all the
defunct railroads, or culling through hundreds of thousands of valuation maps on file in the National Archives,
there is no question that state and local governments have
relied for nearly one century on a legal regime in which the
railroads and the federal government were the only parties they needed to consult in order to utilize their rights
under the statute.69 Even after 1988, when amendments to
§912 took away the rights of municipalities and adjacent
landowners to receive abandoned FGROW, state and local
governments still retained rights to this land for road and
highway purposes, including road crossings. A finding that
the government had no interest in FGROW once it patented the adjoining land would upset nearly one century
of settled property rights in the very same transportation
networks and internal improvements created by the federal
grants at issue.
But what about the landowners’ reliance interests under
a finding that the government did indeed retain control
over FGROW? If a FGROW was abandoned prior to
1922, and the landowners retook possession of the land,
they would have been in possession for close to or more
than 100 years, and any attempt by the government now
to assert rights to the land would be barred by the statute
of limitations. After 1922, landowners received abandoned
FGROW pursuant to §912 for all lands not in a municipality and not used for road or highway purposes. Because a
large percentage of FGROW that was abandoned between
1922 and 1988 passed to landowners anyway by virtue of
§912, a finding that the statute was effective will not upset
their expectations because they received the land already. It
is only if §912 is deemed to be inapplicable that the landowners who received land pursuant to the statute might
find their interests undermined, because the quieting of
their property rights under §912 would not have occurred. 
In essence, since landowners received most of this land
anyway under §912, a finding that §912 is valid will not
have any negative effect on their reliance interests.
But of course, §912 was amended in 1988 to no longer
give landowners any rights in FGROW upon abandonment. If §912 is deemed applicable to all FGROW, then
landowners after 1988 could not have formed any reliance interests because they did not get possession of the
land. They might be entitled to compensation as a result

67. H.R. Rep. No. 843, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4, noting
[i]n many cases, especially in the State of California, there are many
hundreds of miles of State and county highways built along and on
the rights of way belonging to some one of the land-grant railroads,
and the improvement of these highways is very seriously impeded
because neither the State nor the counties can obtain a title to the
right of way for the roads.
68. 43 U.S.C. §913.

69. One of the reasons the government is unlikely to have this information
easily at hand is that both before enactment of §912, and after, there was
no need for a government patent or transfer of title with regard to these
lands; they transferred automatically by operation of §912.  Although the
government knows how much land it gave away, it does not know how
much has been embraced in road crossing or highways by agreement with
the railroads. The thousands of service roads on active rail corridors simply
cannot be estimated.

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

3-2014

NEWS & ANALYSIS

of the delay in regaining possession, but they did not
build houses on that land that might now be overrun by
bicycles. Since every court between 1988 and 2005 held
that §912 was applicable to 1875-Act FGROW, landowners were unable to take possession of adjoining railroad
land and therefore could not form any reliance interests in
land they did not receive.
It is only after 2005, when the Federal Circuit determined in Hash that the adjacent landowners were entitled
to possession of FGROW, that reliance interests might have
begun to accrue. Since 2005, a few courts have followed
the decision in Hash, finding that landowners had rights to
this land. The Court of Federal Claims was required to follow the Federal Circuit decision in Hash, which resulted in
a finding of takings liability in three cases where the corridor was railbanked and converted to a trail.70 One of those
regarded an individual parcel on the same trail as that litigated in Hash. The Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court
of South Dakota also followed the Hash reasoning, ultimately giving possession of the land to adjoining landowners in quiet title actions.71 If the Supreme Court reverses
Hash, and determines that those landowners in fact were
not entitled to possession of the land upon abandonment,
their reliance interests would be jeopardized. However, in
the takings cases, the landowners in fact did not get the
land back; they were compensated for a taking of property
rights they did not have. Whether the government would
demand that they refund their compensation, since it was
later discovered they were not actually entitled to it, is a
question of first impression.
Because §912 actually gave most of this land to the landowners upon abandonment, a finding that §912 is valid will
not upset any of their reliance interests; in fact, it will settle
them. And since 1988, when landowners were not entitled
to take possession of abandoned FGROW, they did not
form reliance interests because they could not have reasonably expected to get that land back. Only since 2005 might
reliance interests have been formed, but in most of those
cases, compensation was paid.  On the other hand, state
and local government and municipalities have extensive
reliance interests for their lands and rights acquired under
§912. Upsetting those interests could wreak havoc on local
governments and those landowners who have acquired the
land from them.

VII. Conclusion
As one can see, the history and jurisprudence behind this
case are quite complex, and I have not even discussed the
reams of legislative history behind both the 1875 Act and
§912 in 1922.72 It is tempting simply to rely on Great
Northern’s articulation of FGROW as an easement and
70. Beres, Blendu, and Ellamae Phillips Co., supra note 63.
71. Samuel Johnson Trust, supra note 64, and Brown v. N. Hills Reg. Rail Auth.,
732 N.W.2d 732 (S.D. 2007).
72. That history is covered in great detail in the briefs and in Darwin Roberts,
The Legal History of Federally Granted Railroad Rights of Way and the Myth of
Congress’ “1871 Shift,” 82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 85 (2011).
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hold that the government has no retained interest in abandoned FGROW, as the court did in Hash, and assume that
compensation will settle the confusion. The problem with
doing so is that the Great Northern decision limited the
railroad’s property rights in order to bolster the government’s rights in these transportation corridors. If a decision
in Brandt Trust would result in negating the government’s
property rights in FGROW because of a narrow reading
of what a common-law easement entails, the Court will be
further compounding the confusion and will open the government to takings liability that will destroy the possibility
of preserving rail corridors for continuing transportation
and communication purposes, which was the public justification for the grants in the first place.
It is not necessary to overrule Great Northern, or any
prior Supreme Court decisions, however, if the Court
simply affirms that the term easement, when used in conjunction with railroad interests, is not a common-law rightof-way, but rather a robust hybrid property interest that has
fee-like and easement-like characteristics.  Thus, the fact
that Congress used the same language to grant FGROW
over a period of one century, and that the congressional
shift in policy in 1875 relates to the grants in aid and not
the right-of-way grants, suggests that there is no functional
difference between 1862-1871 Act FGROW and 1875-Act
FGROW. This means that if Congress passed §912 to dispose of its retained interest in 1862-1871 Act FGROW in
1922, that statute should also dispose of the government’s
functionally identical interest in 1875-Act FGROW. Settling the confusion of the limited fee/easement nomenclature would be a far step in the right direction of correcting
the confusion about the congressional shift in policy
toward the railroads in 1875.
The Court still needs to determine whether a patent to a
private landowner for a section of land, reserving only the
railroad’s right-of-way, also conveyed to the patentee the
federal interest in that right-of-way. The Federal Circuit in
Hash decided that it did. The Tenth Circuit decided that it
did not. But there is plenty of precedent suggesting that the
withdrawal process of the land office precluded the transfer
of any property rights in FGROW that was mapped and
reserved to the railroads, because that land was no longer
public land available for transfer.  There is also a lengthy
congressional history suggesting that Congress intended to
retain ultimate final dispositive control over FGROW, both
during railroad use and occupation, and afterwards. Once
the Court gets past the largely irrelevant easement/limited
fee moniker and retained reversion/servient fee distinctions
to realize that FGROW was always a government grant for
public transportation and communication purposes, then
the right-of-way itself can be seen as a free-standing property right that inheres in the government, and is shared
with the railroads, the telegraphs, the post office, and other
public users, including today’s cyclists.  The right-of-way
returns to the government for continuing public uses, and
only when all public purposes have been waived by an act
of Congress, or a determination of a court of competent
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jurisdiction, will the land underlying these FGROWs be
available for disposition to private owners.
But if the Court rules in favor of the petitioner in
Brandt Trust, then potentially all FGROW would be lost
forever for public transportation purposes or could be
subject to takings liabilities when converted to a highway, transferred to a municipal government, or retained
and banked for future rail reactivation.  The government
would not be able to change the uses of this land as new
technologies are developed without compensating adjoining landowners. On the other hand, if the Court rules in
favor of the government, all reliance interests will be protected, the public’s interest in these quasi-public corridors
will be protected in the future, there will be no takings
liability if a rail corridor is converted to a highway or a trail
pursuant to the railbanking law, and the only landowners
with reliance interest will be those who have relied on the
mis-rule of Hash, and most of that small number received
generous compensation for property rights they did not
have.  Since these were final judgments, the government
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probably could not reclaim the compensation paid. But it
would not be inappropriate to turn off the compensation
spigot that has seriously threatened the public’s interest in
a vibrant national rail and transportation network that was
created through donations of public lands for transportation and communications purposes.  It is ironic that the
constitutional qualms of the early republic that stalled federal investment in internal improvements should come full
circle to requiring compensation to landowners when those
internal improvements continue to be used for the very
transportation purposes for which they were granted. It is
also ironic that the change in federal policy against the lavish land grants for the railroads could result in lavish compensation for adjoining landowners who have no reliance
interests or reasonable investment-backed expectations that
the railroad use would ever cease. These landowners would
reap a windfall by a finding that they had some heretofore
unknown property rights in federally granted rights-ofway that no one knew existed until more than one century
after the property rights were created.
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